arXiv:2604.26274v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Structured-workflow agents driven by large language models execute tool calls against sensitive external environments. We propose codename, a telemetry-driven behavioral anomaly detection firewall. Drawing on sequence-based intrusion detection, codename compiles verified benign tool-call telemetry into a parameterized deterministic finite automaton (pDFA). The model defines permitted tool sequences, sequential contexts, and parameter bounds. At runtime, a lightweight gateway enforces these boundaries via an $O(1)$ state-transition structural lookup, shifting computationally expensive analysis entirely offline. Evaluated on the Agent Security Bench (ASB), codename achieves a 5.6% macro-averaged attack success rate (ASR) across five scenarios. Within three structured workflows, ASR drops to 2.2%, outperforming Aegis, a state-of-the-art stateless scanner, at 12.8%. codename achieves 0% ASR on multi-step and context-sequential attacks in structured settings. Furthermore, against 1,000 algorithmically spliced exfiltration payloads, only 1.4% matched valid structural paths, all of which failed end-to-end string parameter guards (0 successes out of 14 surviving paths, 95% CI [0%, 23.2%]). codename introduces just 2.2~ms of per-call latency (a 3.7$times$ speedup over textscAegis) while maintaining a 2.0% benign task failure rate (BTFR) on benign workloads. Modeling the behavioral trajectory effectively collapses the available attack surface, but unmaintained continuous parameter bounds remain vulnerable to synonym-substitution attacks (18% evasion rate). Thus, exact-match whitelisting of sensitive parameters ultimately bears the final defensive load against execution.
Disclosure in the era of generative artificial intelligence
Generative artificial intelligence (AI) has rapidly become embedded in academic writing, assisting with tasks ranging from language editing to drafting text and producing evidence. Despite



