arXiv:2510.19298v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Most existing work on strategic reasoning simply adopts either an informed or an uninformed semantics. We propose a model where knowledge of strategies can be specified on a fine-grained level. In particular, it is possible to distinguish first-order, higher-order, and common knowledge of strategies. We illustrate the effect of higher-order knowledge of strategies by studying the game Hanabi. Further, we show that common knowledge of strategies is necessary to solve the consensus problem. Finally, we study the decidability of the model checking problem.
The Hidden Power of Normalization: Exponential Capacity Control in Deep Neural Networks
arXiv:2511.00958v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Normalization methods are fundamental components of modern deep neural networks (DNNs). Empirically, they are known to stabilize optimization dynamics and


