A New Lower Bound for the Random Offerer Mechanism in Bilateral Trade using AI-Guided Evolutionary Search

arXiv:2603.08679v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: The celebrated Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem shows that in bilateral trade, no mechanism can be simultaneously fully efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC), and budget balanced (BB). This naturally raises the question of how closely the gains from trade (GFT) achievable by a BIC and BB mechanism can approximate the first-best (fully efficient) benchmark. The optimal BIC and BB mechanism is typically complex and highly distribution-dependent, making it difficult to characterize directly. Consequently, much of the literature analyzes simpler mechanisms such as the Random-Offerer (RO) mechanism and establishes constant-factor guarantees relative to the first-best GFT. An important open question concerns the worst-case performance of the RO mechanism relative to first-best (FB) efficiency. While it was originally hypothesized that the approximation ratio $fractextGFT_textFBtextGFT_textRO$ is bounded by $2$, recent work provided counterexamples to this conjecture: Cai et al. proved that the ratio can be strictly larger than $2$, and Babaioff et al. exhibited an explicit example with ratio approximately $2.02$.
In this work, we employ AlphaEvolve, an AI-guided evolutionary search framework, to explore the space of value distributions. We identify a new worst-case instance that yields an improved lower bound of $fractextGFT_textFBtextGFT_textRO ge textbf2.0749$. This establishes a new lower bound on the worst-case performance of the Random-Offerer mechanism, demonstrating a wider efficiency gap than previously known.