Integrated information theory: the good, the bad and the misunderstood

arXiv:2604.11482v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) is uniquely ambitious in proposing a mathematical formula, derived from apparently fundamental properties of conscious experience, to describe the quantity and quality of consciousness for any physical system that possesses it. IIT has generated considerable debate, which has engendered some misunderstandings and misrepresentations. Here we address and hope to remedy this. We begin by concisely summarising the essentials of IIT. Given IIT is supposed to apply universally, we do this with reference to an arbitrary patch of matter, as opposed to the usual system of discrete computational units. Then, after briefly summarising IIT’s theoretical and empirical achievements, we focus on five points which we consider especially important for driving forward new theory and increasing understanding. First, a high value of the measure $Phi$ is not synonymous with `more consciousness’. We describe how $Phi$ might be replaced with a suite of quantities to obtain a multi-dimensional characterisation of states of consciousness. Second, we describe with nuance the distinct flavour of panpsychism implied by IIT — whereby space (and time) are tiled with substrates of (proto-) consciousness — and find this is not problematic for the theory. Third, $Phi$ is not well-defined for real physical systems, and has not been computed on any real physical system. Fourth, so far only proxies for IIT measures have been computed, and not approximations. Fifth, for IIT to fit with current successful theories in fundamental physics, a reformulation in terms of continuous fields would be needed.