Markets with Heterogeneous Agents: Dynamics and Survival of Bayesian vs. No-Regret Learners

arXiv:2502.08597v3 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: We analyze the performance of heterogeneous learning agents in asset markets with stochastic payoffs. Our main focus is on comparing Bayesian learners and no-regret learners who compete in markets and identifying the conditions under which each approach is more effective. We formally relate the notions of survival and market dominance studied in economics and the framework of regret minimization, thereby bridging these theories. A central finding is that regret plays a key role in market selection, but low regret alone does not guarantee survival: surprisingly, an agent may achieve even logarithmic regret and yet be driven out of the market when competing against a Bayesian learner with a finite prior that assigns positive probability to the correct model. At the same time, we show that Bayesian learning is highly fragile, while no-regret learning requires less knowledge of the environment and is therefore more robust. Motivated by this contrast, we propose two simple hybrid strategies that incorporate Bayesian updates while improving robustness and adaptability to distribution shifts, taking a step toward a best-of-both-worlds learning approach. More broadly, our work contributes to the understanding of dynamics of heterogeneous learning agents and their impact on markets.