THRD: A Training-Free Multi-Turn Defense Framework for Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models

arXiv:2606.01738v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Multi-turn jailbreak attacks pose a growing threat to LLMs by exploiting conversational dynamics such as gradual escalation and cross-turn coordination. Existing defenses either rely on costly retraining — often degrading model utility — or apply single-turn analysis independently at each turn, failing to capture how risk accumulates along interaction trajectories. We observe that safety behavior in multi-turn interaction is trajectory-dependent: dialogue history continuously reshapes the model’s conditioning context, making it insufficient to evaluate each turn in isolation. Motivated by this insight, we present THRD, the first training-free framework that explicitly models temporal risk accumulation for multi-turn jailbreak defense. THRD integrates four modules: a Turn-level Risk Assessor (TRA) for instantaneous risk estimation, a Historical Context Analyzer (HCA) for cross-turn intent escalation detection, a Response Evaluator (RE) for identifying facilitative outputs, and a Decision Module that combines these signals through a time-evolving scoring mechanism with attenuation-based modulation and trend-aware adjustment. Experiments against state-of-the-art multi-turn attacks — including tree-search-based and multi-agent collaborative methods — across two target models show that THRD reduces ASR to 0.2–4.0% while preserving model utility within 1.5% degradation on MMLU and GSM8K. Ablation studies confirm non-redundant module contributions and stable cross-architecture generalization. Analysis of first rejection triggers reveals that over 70% of multi-turn attacks require Turn~2 or later to detect, validating the necessity of explicit temporal aggregation.